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THE DEATH OF JUDICIAL 
CONSERVATISM 
DAVID A. STRAUSS* 
If we are talking about what happened during the Bush 
Administration, “The Death of Judicial Conservatism” looks like it is 
either a misprint or the deluded ramblings of a liberal who did not get 
the memo. But I think it is fair to say that one of the lessons we have 
learned in the wake of the Bush Administration’s appointments to the 
Supreme Court is that judicial conservatism no longer exists in any 
significant form. Or at least so I argue here. 
To say that judicial conservatism has died is not to say that its 
opposite, judicial liberalism or progressivism, has flourished. It is 
clearer than ever that people who hoped for the revival of the Warren 
Court—a court that had an agenda to be at the forefront of what it 
considered to be social reform in a generally liberal direction—had 
better give up that hope for at least a generation. That is an obvious 
lesson of the Bush appointments. President Bush’s appointees, Chief 
Justice Roberts and Justice Alito, are young (by the standards of 
Supreme Court appointees)1 and extremely able. We can expect them 
to be on the Court for a long time, and we can expect them to write 
important and influential opinions. Those Justices quite clearly have 
no interest in reviving Warren Court liberalism. 
It has also become clear that, when a Republican is President, the 
judicial appointments process is controlled by a wing of the 
Republican Party that is, to say the least, hostile to the kind of 
Supreme Court that liberals or progressives might want.2 That wing of 
 
 * Gerald Ratner Distinguished Service Professor of Law, the University of Chicago. I am 
grateful to Christopher Schroeder for the invitation to deliver the lecture from which this article 
is derived, and to him and the other members of the audience on that occasion. 
 1. See Kevin T. McGuire, Are the Justices Serving Too Long? An Assessment of Tenure on 
the U.S. Supreme Court, http://www.unc.edu/~kmcguire/papers/tenure.pdf (finding the average 
age of Supreme Court appointees between 1851 and 2005 is in the mid-50s). 
 2. Cf. William G. Ross, The Role of Judicial Issues in Presidential Campaigns,  
42 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 391, 462–72 (2001) (discussing the role that judicial nominations 
played in the 2000 election, including pre-election predictions that, if elected president,  
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the Republican Party is also deeply committed to making sure that 
judicial appointments carry out its principles.3 This is not a judgment; 
it is just a fact. Presidents of both political parties have used their 
Supreme Court appointments to pursue a political agenda,4 and there 
is not necessarily anything wrong with that. I do think, however, it is 
accurate to say that people with a clear agenda dominated the judicial 
appointments process in the Bush Administration. 
When President Bush tried to appoint his counsel, Harriet Miers, 
to the Supreme Court, he was rebuffed not by the Democrats but by 
people in his own party. These Republicans were concerned not just 
about whether she was distinguished enough to be appointed to the 
Supreme Court but also about whether she was sufficiently “reliable” 
and committed to certain views.5 Meanwhile, the Democratic Party 
did not have the inclination or the ability to fight the conservative 
appointments that the President’s party wanted him to make. 
Put all of those things together—the exceptional ability and 
relative youth of the two most recent appointments, the already 
conservative character of the Court, the Republican Party’s 
commitment to making conservative appointments, and the 
Democrats’ relative lack of ability to use the Court to advance an 
agenda—and the idea that there might be a revival of something like 
the Warren Court in the next generation is, in a word, chimerical. That 
is pretty obvious. What is less obvious—and a little paradoxical—is 
that we are also dealing with something that can fairly be 
characterized as the end of judicial conservatism. 
 
George W. Bush would appoint “strict constructionists” who would likely decide cases in a 
manner well-received by Republicans). 
 3. Cf. Cliff Schecter, Extremely Motivated: The Republican Party’s March to the Right,  
29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1663, 1667 (2002) (finding that the predominant vocal members of the 
Republican Party since the early Clinton years have been increasingly right-wing on issues 
connected with the Court such as “abortion, guns, and minority rights”). 
 4. Franklin Roosevelt used his extensive tenure in the White House to make 
appointments that secured his New Deal programs. Ronald Reagan tried to achieve the same 
goal in a “Conservative Revolution.” See Graeme Browning, Reagan Molds the Federal Court in 
His Own Image, 71 A.B.A. J. 60, 60 (1985) (analyzing President Roosevelt’s and President 
Reagan’s judicial appointments). 
 5. See David K. Kirkpatrick, After Miers, the Right Is Expecting More, N.Y. TIMES,  
Oct. 30, 2005, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/30/politics/politicsspecial1/ 
30confirm.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=After Miers, the Right is Expecting More&st=cse (quoting 
various conservative commentators and politicians regarding their distrust of Miers’ political 
agenda). 
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How can it be that, if the liberals have been vanquished, the 
conservatives have not triumphed? To begin thinking about that 
question, we must ask: what exactly is judicial conservatism? What 
does it mean to be a conservative Supreme Court Justice? 
Let me start with three things that judicial conservatism cannot be. 
First, some conservatives say that being a judicial conservative means 
following the original understandings of the Constitution.6 This means 
that conservative judges should adhere to the intentions or the 
understandings of the people who drafted or ratified the Constitution; 
in the most common current formulation, they should look at how the 
Constitution was understood at the time when its various provisions 
were ratified.7 But originalism cannot be what it means to be a judicial 
conservative, for several reasons. 
For one thing, the idea that Justices can interpret the Constitution 
by uncovering the understandings or intentions of the Framers has 
been repeatedly discredited, beginning with Thomas Jefferson.8 The 
first problem is that it is not doable.9 It is hard enough to figure out 
what the Framers were thinking more than two hundred years ago. 
Then even if you do figure that out, you have to apply the Framers’ 
thoughts to our completely different world—one which the Framers 
could not possibly have foreseen.10 Even if you could do all of that, 
why would it be a good idea? To paraphrase Jefferson, why should we 
be ruled by people who are long dead?11 Underlying all of this is an 
even bigger risk: not that we will be ruled by the dead, but rather that 
 
 6. Ernest Young, Rediscovering Conservatism: Burkean Political Theory and 
Constitutional Interpretation, 72 N.C. L. REV. 619, 626 (1994) (describing conservatism as 
originalism but not endorsing this view). 
 7. ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE 
LAW 133, 143 (1990). 
 8. See, e.g., David A. Strauss, Common Law, Common Ground, and Jefferson’s Principle, 
112 YALE L.J. 1717, 1721–22 (2003) (analyzing Thomas Jefferson’s belief that “[t]he earth 
belongs in usufruct to the living” and that laws from one generation should not bind another 
generation). 
 9. See H. Jefferson Powell, Rules for Originalists, 73 VA. L. REV. 659, 659–66 (1987) 
(arguing that an interpreter, no matter how intellectually responsible, necessarily imposes his 
own historical judgments when contextualizing the Framers’ intents). 
 10. Id. at 665. 
 11. “Can one generation bind another and all others in succession forever? I think not. The 
Creator has made the earth for the living, not the dead. Rights and powers can only belong to 
persons, not to things, not to mere matter unendowed with will.” Letter from Thomas Jefferson 
to John Cartwright, Major in the British Royal Navy (1824), in THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS 
JEFFERSON MEMORIAL EDITION 16, 48 (Lipscomb & Bergh eds., 1903–04). 
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living people will claim to be following the original understandings 
when, in fact, they are just following their own views.12 
But even if originalism could somehow be justified, and made to 
work, there is no reason to view it as a conservative approach to the 
Constitution. Originalism is by no means something that has 
historically been identified with people who are called conservatives.13 
The most influential originalist judge of the last hundred years was 
Justice Hugo Black, and he was not a conservative at all: he was a 
mainstay of the Warren Court. Justice Black was far more influential 
in carrying out what he saw as the original understandings than any of 
the present-day conservative originalists.14 That does not prove that 
originalism is a distinctively liberal approach—it may just be a highly 
manipulable approach—but it is not a distinctively conservative 
approach either. 
The two Bush appointees show no signs of being tempted to be 
originalists. In their confirmation hearings they did not embrace 
originalism.15 In his confirmation hearings, Chief Justice Roberts did 
not ever say something like, “I believe the Constitution should be 
interpreted according to the original understandings.”16 Justice Alito 
made a fleeting reference to the original understandings in a list of 
things that he would take into account.17 But neither Justice identified 
himself as an originalist, as Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas would 
(and have).18 My hypothesis is that originalism proved useful to 
conservatives when they were attacking what they saw as a mistaken 
 
 12. Powell, supra note 9, at 661. 
 13. Young, supra note 6, at 619. 
 14. David A. Strauss, Symposium Essays on Originalism: II. Originalism and Precedent: 
Why Conservatives Shouldn’t Be Originalists, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 969, 975 (2008). 
 15. See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr., To Be Chief 
Justice of the United States: Hearing Before the Comm. on the Judiciary United States Senate, 
109th Cong. 55 (2005); Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr., To Be 
an Associate Justice of the United States, Hearing Before the Comm. on the Judiciary United 
States Senate, 109th Cong. (2006), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/ 
content/article/2006/01/10/AR2006011000781.html. 
 16. See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr., To Be Chief 
Justice of the United States: Hearing Before the Comm. on the Judiciary United States Senate, 
109th Cong. 55 (2005). 
 17. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr., To Be an Associate 
Justice of the United States, Hearing Before the Comm. on the Judiciary United States Senate, 
109th Cong. (2006), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/ 
2006/01/10/AR2006011000781.html. 
 18. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 862 
(1989). 
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status quo, just as originalism proved useful to Justice Black when he 
was attacking the pre-New Deal status quo.19 But Chief Justice 
Roberts and Justice Alito have spent their careers in a period when 
the Supreme Court was resolutely conservative, so they are mostly 
comfortable with the status quo, and originalism does not appeal to 
them. 
So judicial conservatism is not a commitment to the original 
understandings. The second thing that judicial conservatism is not, is 
so-called “strict constructionism.” Often, a conservative politician will 
call for judges to be strict constructionists. But what does strict 
constructionism mean? What is the antonym of strict 
constructionism? If strict constructionism means following the law, 
then saying a judge is not a strict constructionist just means that you 
disagree with his or her decisions. At one time in our history, strict 
constructionism had a fairly clear meaning: in the early days of the 
Republic, it meant that the powers of the federal government would 
be narrowly confined.20 That was the Jeffersonian position,21 in 
opposition to the view of Alexander Hamilton and Hamilton’s allies, 
who thought the powers of the federal government should be given a 
more expansive interpretation.22 Whether Jefferson’s view was right or 
not, it was a coherent view of what strict construction means: the 
federal government’s powers should be strictly limited. 
That, however, is not where today’s conservatives are going when 
they call for strict construction. I will return to this point later, but I 
think what “strict construction” usually means today is: “Roe v. Wade 
was wrong.”23 There are reputable people who think Roe v. Wade is 
 
 19. Strauss, supra note 14, at 975. 
 20. See DAVID N. MAYER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 196 
(Univ. Press of Virginia 1994) (describing Jefferson’s strict theory of constitutional 
interpretation); CALEB PERRY PATTERSON, THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES OF THOMAS 
JEFFERSON 70 (Peter Smith 1967) (1953) (“Jefferson insisted on a strict construction of the 
Constitution and founded a party to perpetuate his constitutional principles.”). 
 21. MAYER, supra note 20, at 196; PATTERSON, supra note 20, at 70. 
 22. MAYER, supra note 20, at 196 (describing the divergence in Jefferson and Hamilton’s 
theories of constitutional interpretation); PATTERSON, supra note 20, at 126 (contrasting 
Jefferson’s strict-construction theory of constitutional interpretation with Hamilton’s loose-
construction theory of constitutional interpretation). 
 23. See David R. Stras, Understanding the New Politics of Judicial Appointments,  
86 TEX. L. REV. 1033, 1037 (2008) (reviewing BENJAMIN WITTES, CONFIRMATION WARS: 
PRESERVING INDEPENDENT COURTS IN ANGRY TIMES (2006) and JAN CRAWFORD, SUPREME 
CONFLICT: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF THE UNITED STATES 
SUPREME COURT (2007)) (“Other times references to the abortion issue are masked by 
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wrong; the constitutional status of the right to abortion is an 
important and complex issue. But if what you want to say is that Roe 
v. Wade is wrong, then say that. Don’t start talking about strict 
construction, which either means something entirely different or has 
no useful meaning at all. 
The third meaning that judicial conservatism might have is 
something like “just follow the law.” Liberals, according to this 
account, make up new law to fit their moral and political views, while 
conservatives decide cases in accordance with the law. If we put aside 
the talk about liberals and conservatives for a moment, there is an 
interesting issue here. Why does a Court or a Justice need a theory, an 
approach, or an ideology? Why not just be a judge and decide the 
cases? That is a powerful question, and I will try to answer it before I 
am done—although it will be only a partial answer. For now the thing 
to bear in mind is that in most of the cases that reach the Supreme 
Court, good lawyers will disagree about what the right answer is. Of 
course there are plenty of legal questions to which a good lawyer can 
give only one answer. But most of those questions do not find their 
way to the Supreme Court; most of them do not find their way into 
court at all. In almost any high-profile, controversial case in the 
Supreme Court, good lawyers can disagree about the answer and still 
be good lawyers.24 
For that reason, just saying “I am going to decide the cases in 
accordance with the law” only gets a judge so far. When it comes to 
Supreme Court cases, people can share that commitment, act 
conscientiously and in complete good faith, and still disagree most of 
 
obfuscation, such as when presidents like George W. Bush talk about appointing nominees who 
are ‘strict constructionists’ or those who will not ‘use the bench to write social policy.’”);  
Ward Farnsworth, The Regulation of Turnover on the Supreme Court, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 407, 
423 (2005) (citing Stephen L. Carter, Bork Redux, or How the Tempting of America Led the 
People to Rise and Battle for Justice, 69 TEX. L. REV. 759, 776 (1991)) (“‘Strict construction’ is a 
slogan, a signaling device to denote types of judges who will produce certain outcomes.”);  
see also Vice President Albert Gore, Jr., Presidential Debate (October 3, 2000) (transcript 
available at 2000 WL 1466168 (F.D.C.H.)) (“And when the phrase ‘strict constructionist’ is 
used, and when the names of Scalia and Thomas are used as benchmarks for who would be 
appointed, those are code words . . . for saying that the governor would appoint people who 
would overturn Roe v. Wade.”). 
 24. See Frederick Schauer, Incentives, Reputation, and the Inglorious Determinants of 
Judicial Behavior, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 615, 621–22 n.39 (2000) (citing George Priest & Benjamin 
Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEG. STUD. 1 (1984)) (“[C]ases wind up in 
court in direct proportion to their legal difficulty . . . since litigation presupposes two mutually 
exclusive positions each of whose adherents has some reason to believe that she will prevail.”). 
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the time. Their disagreement is the result not of a difference in legal 
skill, but of a difference in vision, in their sense of fairness, in their 
ideas about the role the Court should play. That is why it is not 
enough to say that a judicial conservative is someone who decides the 
case in a lawyer-like fashion. The important question is: what does 
judicial conservatism mean at the point where good lawyers disagree? 
None of those three approaches—originalism, “strict 
construction,” or just-follow-the-law—gives a plausible account of 
what judicial conservatism might be. What might a plausible form of 
judicial conservatism consist of, then? One important and time-
honored view is that judicial conservatives believe in judicial 
restraint.25 Now, when you talk about “judicial restraint” and “judicial 
activism,” you are at the risk of just engaging in rhetoric and 
attaching labels. But judicial restraint can be given a coherent content; 
it is a view that was clearly and forcefully articulated at one point in 
our history.26 The view is that the courts should not overturn the 
decisions of the people’s elected representatives except in extreme 
cases.27 If Congress or the state legislatures do something truly 
irrational or truly indefensible, then, but only then, the courts should 
step in and declare it unconstitutional.28 This is sometimes 
characterized as the “rule of the clear mistake.”29 It has to be a clear 
mistake by the elected branches of government or else the Court 
should not get involved.30 
Probably the most vigorous proponent of this view in the Supreme 
Court’s history was Justice Felix Frankfurter,31 a Franklin Roosevelt 
 
 25. See Young, supra note 6, at 626–27 (describing judicial restraint as one of “three 
primary methodological themes that . . . represent the basic tenets of modern conservative 
constitutionalism”). 
 26. See Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 12 
(1996) (“The position can be found as well in the writings of Justice Holmes, the first Justice 
Harlan, Justice Frankfurter, and, most recently, Chief Justice Rehnquist.”). 
 27. Young, supra note 6, at 626–27. 
 28. See Sunstein, supra note 26, at 11–12 (citing James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of 
the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 139–52 (1893)). 
 29. Id. 
 30. See James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional 
Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 144 (1893) (limiting judicial action to those occasions “when those 
who have the right to make laws have not merely made a mistake, but have made a very clear 
one—so clear that it is not open to rational question”). 
 31. See FELIX FRANKFURTER REMINISCES 301 (Harlan B. Phillips ed., Reynal & 
Company, Inc. 1960) (“I regard Thayer’s essay [about the limited role of the judiciary] as the 
most important single essay. . . . He was a very great man.”). 
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appointee, and possibly the most famous statement of this view is 
Justice Frankfurter’s dissenting opinion in West Virginia State Board 
of Education v. Barnette.32 The majority of the Supreme Court, in fact 
everybody but Justice Frankfurter, voted to strike down a West 
Virginia law that required schoolchildren to say the Pledge of 
Allegiance.33 Justice Frankfurter wrote an emotional and personal 
dissent in which he said that while he sympathized with religious 
minorities—the children in the case were Jehovah’s Witnesses whose 
religious creed forbade them to salute the flag—he simply did not 
think it was the Court’s job to strike down the law.34 The judgment of 
the people of West Virginia was that schoolchildren should be saying 
the Pledge of Allegiance, and that, Justice Frankfurter said, was not 
obviously unconstitutional—in fact, the Court, with mostly different 
members, had upheld a compulsory flag salute law just a few years 
earlier.35 Justice Frankfurter disapproved of the law, and there was a 
plausible argument that the law was unconstitutional, but, because it 
was not entirely clear that the law was unconstitutional, Justice 
Frankfurter voted to uphold it. 
Even Justice Frankfurter did not practice this form of judicial 
restraint consistently throughout his career on the Court, and since he 
left the Court in 1962, the number of Justices who have practiced 
judicial restraint of this kind is zero.36 Certainly nobody on the Court 
today holds this view of the Court’s role. Every Justice since 
Frankfurter has voted to declare measures unconstitutional that were 
not obviously unconstitutional. We are accustomed to the idea that 
the Court will do this, and no Justice since Frankfurter has even 
advocated his form of judicial restraint. 
It is theoretically possible that this form of “clear mistake” judicial 
restraint could be revived: it has some important academic 
 
 32. W.Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 646–71 (1943) (Frankfurter, J. 
dissenting). 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 646–71. 
 35. Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940). 
 36. Cf. Sunstein, supra note 26, at 13 (“Chief Justice Rehnquist has often endorsed the rule 
of clear mistake, and he is probably the most consistent proponent of this view in recent 
decades. But in cases involving affirmative action, the Chief Justice speaks in quite different 
terms; here his method is more like a form of independent interpretive judgment.”). 
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advocates.37 As far as Acts of Congress are concerned, such an 
approach might amount to the effective end of judicial review, 
because it is hard to imagine Congress passing a law so extreme that it 
would be obviously unconstitutional. It is more likely that a local 
government, or conceivably a state government, might do something 
that makes you shake your head in embarrassment and amazement.38 
But the current Court, including the so-called conservatives on the 
current Court, is nowhere near being so restrained.39 
There are many examples, but two recent ones are especially 
notable. The Court has struck down two significant provisions of the 
McCain-Feingold Campaign Finance Reform Act,40 an important 
statute that was the product of extensive deliberation in Congress41 
and that, whatever else might be said of it, was not irrational or 
transparently unconstitutional.42 Both George W. Bush appointees 
voted to invalidate these provisions.43 In one of the cases, Chief Justice 
Roberts led the charge with an opinion saying that when in doubt the 
Court should err on the side of protecting political speech.44 That 
credo may be an admirable one, but it is exactly the opposite of 
judicial restraint. 
In the 2007-2008 Supreme Court term, the most dramatic example 
of a decision that tossed judicial restraint overboard was District of 
Columbia v. Heller, the case in which the Court struck down the 
District of Columbia’s gun control ordinance on the ground that it 
 
 37. E.g., ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL 
THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 254–84 (Harvard Univ. Press 2006). 
 38. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered: Defining a Role for the Federal Judiciary, 
36 UCLA L. REV. 233, 264 (1988) (citing the possibility that “Congress and the state legislatures 
might not be equally likely to enact unconstitutional statutes” as creating a difference in the 
content of litigation in state and federal courts). 
 39. Cf. Sunstein, supra note 26, at 13 (describing Rehnquist’s selective application of the 
rule of clear mistake). 
 40. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652 (2007) (holding that restrictions on issue 
ads in the months preceding elections are unconstitutional); Davis v. FEC, 128 S. Ct. 2759 
(2008) (holding that the so-called “Millionaire’s Amendment” violated the First Amendment by 
imposing a substantial burden on the right to use personal funds for campaign speech). 
 41. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002). 
 42. Wis. Right to Life, 127 S. Ct. at 2704 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“The Court (and, I think, 
the country) loses when important precedent is overruled without good reason, and there is no 
justification for departing from our usual rule of stare decisis here.”). 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 2659 (“[T]he First Amendment requires us to err on the side of protecting 
political speech rather than suppressing it.”). 
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violated the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms.45 
Maybe that decision was right; maybe it was wrong—that is an 
argument we can have on another day. But no one, I believe, can 
seriously say that the statute was obviously unconstitutional.46 There 
are many other examples, but those two examples should be enough 
to dispel any idea that judicial conservatism today takes the form of 
severe Frankfurter-like judicial restraint. 
If judicial conservatives today do not believe in judicial restraint, 
then what do they believe in? Perhaps the core of judicial 
conservatism is protecting federalism and states’ rights. The idea 
would be that the Court’s most important job is to protect state and 
local governments—the forms of government closest to the people—
from the remote, overbearing federal government.47 There were hints, 
during the Rehnquist era, that the Supreme Court was moving in this 
direction; in some celebrated cases, the Rehnquist Court, reversing a 
trend that had existed since the New Deal, struck down acts of 
Congress on the grounds that they exceeded Congress’ powers under 
the Commerce Clause.48 
I am pretty confident that the Court will not continue to move 
seriously in that direction. The two Justices who believed most 
strongly in federalism have both left the Court—Chief Justice 
Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor.49 Their replacements’ careers have 
been, in both cases, focused almost exclusively on the federal 
government,50 and Justices Roberts and Alito do not seem to be 
 
 45. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008). 
 46. Cf. id. at 2816 (holding that the right secured by the Second Amendment is not 
unlimited). 
 47. See, e.g., Ernest Young, The Conservative Case for Federalism, 74 GEO. WASH.  
L. REV. 874, 883–84 (2006) (noting the special role that federalism plays in protecting individual 
liberties). 
 48. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (holding that possession of a 
firearm near a school is not an economic activity that has a substantial effect on interstate 
commerce); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (holding that the Violence Against 
Women Act of 1994 is unconstitutional as exceeding Congressional power under the Commerce 
Clause). 
 49. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Sandra Day O’Connor showed their adherence to 
federalist values by authoring United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), and United States v. 
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), respectively. Chief Justice Rehnquist died on September 3, 2005, 
and Justice Sandra Day O’Connor retired from the Court on January 31, 2006. 
 50. The Justices of the Supreme Court, http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/ 
biographiescurrent.pdf (last visited May 20, 2009). 
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committed to federalism in anything like the same way as the Justices 
they replaced. 
This kind of biographical speculation is not totally convincing, but 
what should be convincing is a particularly dramatic and recent 
example of the current Court’s refusal to allow local governments a 
measure of autonomy to deal with a sensitive and intensely local 
problem. In 2007, the Court decided a case involving the efforts of 
two local school boards to bring about racial integration in their 
schools.51 The school boards in these cases used racial criteria in order 
to make their schools less homogeneous.52 The Supreme Court said 
that what the local school boards did was unconstitutional.53 The two 
Bush appointees voted with the majority, and Chief Justice Roberts 
wrote the strongly-worded prevailing opinion. 
Here you have local school boards, addressing a local problem—
an intensely difficult local problem, having to do with sensitive issues 
of education and racial dynamics—using their judgment and deciding 
that they wanted to address the problem in a certain way. And the 
Supreme Court tells them that they cannot do it. Again, whatever the 
merits of the Supreme Court’s decision, the one thing you cannot say 
is that this is a Court that cares deeply about local prerogatives and 
protecting local governments from the intrusions of people in 
Washington, D.C. 
What makes this example particularly dramatic is that in two 
cases—one that the Supreme Court reviewed54 and one that was 
similar but did not reach the Supreme Court55—prominent lower 
court judges with strong conservative credentials voted to uphold 
race-conscious integration plans precisely because those judges 
thought that local educational authorities should not have their 
decisions second-guessed by federal judges. In other words, the 
Supreme Court had before it the conservative case for keeping the 
federal government out of the business of local governments. But that 
kind of judicial conservatism was flatly and unequivocally rejected by 
 
 51. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007). 
 52. Id. at 2746–50. 
 53. Id. at 2758. 
 54. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 426 F.3d 1162, 1193–96  
(9th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (Kozinski, J., concurring), rev’d, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007). 
 55. Comfort v. Lynn School Comm., 418 F.3d 1, 27–29 (1st Cir. 2005) (Boudin, C.J., 
concurring). 
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the conservatives on the Supreme Court, including the two Bush 
appointees, without, it appears, so much as a second thought.56 I think 
we can be confident in saying that the form of judicial conservatism 
practiced by this Court is not one that is highly solicitous of the 
prerogatives of state and local governments. 
There are other examples. Heller, the Second Amendment case, is 
one. Although Heller did not resolve the question whether the Second 
Amendment applies to the states, the Court in Heller seemed 
unmoved by the idea that, given the extreme variation in local 
circumstances and attitudes across the country, gun control is another 
issue that should be resolved on the local level rather than 
constitutionalized and resolved by the Supreme Court in 
Washington.57 But, for me at least, the school integration cases are the 
clearest examples. 
If judicial conservatism, post-Bush, is neither judicial restraint of 
the Frankfurter variety nor federalism of the O’Connor variety, what 
else might it be? Perhaps it is a libertarian view, the idea that the role 
of the courts is to keep all government—federal government, state 
government, and local government—generally in check.58 The threat 
to individual freedom comes from government, and the Court’s 
distinctive role is to protect individuals against government 
overreaching. 
That view of the judicial role is again more or less coherent, 
although libertarians do have many difficult line-drawing problems 
that call into question whether there is an underlying principle.59 And 
libertarianism can go much further in cutting back on the government 
than most of us would be willing to go.60 But there is some appeal—
 
 56. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2755 (“The plans here are not tailored to achieving a 
degree of diversity necessary to realize the asserted educational benefits . . . .”). 
 57. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2820 (2008) (holding that the 
Second Amendment to the United States Constitution protects an individual right to possess a 
firearm for private use). 
 58. See Jeffrey Rosen, So What’s the ‘Right’ Pick?, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2005, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/03/weekinreview/03rosen.html?scp=3&sq=So What’s the 
‘Right’ Pick?&st=cse (explaining how the libertarian concept of judicial conservatism involves 
“anti-government and pro-individual liberties”). 
 59. See supra note 58 (quoting Harvard Law Professor Jack Goldsmith, who explains how 
libertarian conservatives, despite being associated with originalism, sometimes show “real 
commitment” to individual liberty rather than to “original understanding or judicial restraint”). 
 60. See Brenda Cossman, Contesting Conservatisms, Family Feuds and the Privatization of 
Dependency, 13 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 415, 433 (2005) (explaining that according 
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maybe even a lot of appeal—to the idea that protecting against 
overreaching government is a good role for the courts to play. 
Again there were glimmerings in the Rehnquist era that the Court 
might have been moving in this direction.61 But again, a lesson of the 
Bush years is that today’s judicial conservatives are not libertarians. 
Exhibit A is last term’s decision in Boumediene v. Bush, the case 
involving the detainees imprisoned in Guantanamo.62 In that case, the 
Court declared unconstitutional the statute that limited the detainees’ 
right to challenge their confinement.63 But there were four dissenters: 
the two Bush appointees and the two people—Justice Scalia and 
Justice Thomas—whom President Bush took as his ostensible models 
for those appointees.64 The Bush-era conservatives were comfortable, 
as a constitutional matter, with what the government was doing in 
Guantanamo.65 
I do not want to suggest that the legal issues in Boumediene were 
all straightforward or one-sided. But anyone who believes that the 
courts’ role is to protect individual liberty from overreaching 
government should find it extremely difficult to accept what the 
government was doing in that case. The detainees were in 
Guantanamo because the executive branch of the federal government 
deliberately decided to hold people in a way that would escape 
judicial scrutiny.66 The government chose Guantanamo because it 
wanted to keep the detainees in a place where it could control them 
completely, but where the executive branch lawyers thought the 
 
to classical liberal theory, “this liberty thrives on the economic liberty of a free market, and the 
political liberty of a minimal state”). 
 61. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 235 
(Vicki Been et al. eds., Aspen Publishers 2006) (1997) (explaining that after 1995, the Supreme 
Court “limited the scope of Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause and under section 5 
of the Fourteenth Amendment” and “revived the Tenth Amendment as a limit on federal 
power”); see also United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); City of Boerne v. Flores,  
521 U.S. 507 (1997); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); United States v. Lopez,  
514 U.S. 549 (1995); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
 62. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008). 
 63. Id. at 2240. 
 64. Id. at 2279. 
 65. See id. at 2280 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (describing the Detainee Treatment Act as 
“the most generous set of procedural protections” and holding that it “adequately protects any 
constitutional rights aliens captured abroad and detained as enemy combatants may enjoy”). 
 66. See id. at 2252 (majority opinion) (noting that the United States contends that the 
Suspension Clause affords the detainees no rights because the United States does not claim 
sovereignty over Guantanamo Bay where the detainees are being held). 
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courts could not help them.67 Guantanamo was just foreign enough so 
that aliens being held there could not assert their rights under the 
Constitution, but not so foreign that the government would have, as a 
practical matter, problems controlling what went on there.68 
Whether the government’s actions in dealing with these 
individuals were morally acceptable, sensible, admirable, or necessary 
is a complex question. But if you are a conservative judge who defines 
judicial conservatism as a matter of using the courts to establish a 
bulwark against an overreaching government, then your every instinct 
should rebel against what the government was doing in Guantanamo. 
You should tell the government that the one thing it cannot do is 
effectively disable the courts from even entertaining a claim that the 
government has overreached. Even if there is room for reasonable 
disagreement about the level of constitutional protection the 
detainees should receive, you should find it intolerable for the 
government to choose a stratagem specifically to prevent the courts 
from deciding that question. 
The conservatives who dissented in Boumediene did not find the 
government’s position intolerable. Whether the government’s position 
in Boumediene was right or wrong is, in fact, a difficult question. But 
you cannot say that the Justices who voted for that position are 
libertarians who believe that the principal role of courts is to protect 
against government—especially executive branch—overreaching. On 
a major issue, their considered judgment was in favor of giving 
substantial deference to the executive branch. Maybe that is the right 
approach to take, but it is not libertarian. 
If the conservatism of the Bush era is not judicial restraint, 
federalism, or libertarianism, then what is it? I believe we are left with 
a set of beliefs that, while it calls itself conservative, is unable to 
support any coherent conservative creed. There is no coherent, 
principled conservative explanation of what the role of the Supreme 
Court should be in our system that corresponds to what so-called 
conservative Justices—such as the Bush appointees—are committed 
 
 67. See id. (“The United States exercises ‘complete jurisdiction and control’ [over 
Guantanamo] . . . [but] contends, nevertheless, that Guantanamo is not within its sovereign 
control.”). 
 68. See id. (stating that under the terms of the lease between the United States and Cuba, 
the United States has “complete jurisdiction and control” over Guantanamo Bay, although 
Cuba has “ultimate sovereignty” over the territory). 
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to. This lack of a coherent conservative view of the role of the courts 
is, I think, a lesson that has emerged from the Bush era. 
Why does that matter? Academics and journalists like to identify 
themes and ideologies among the Justices, so maybe it is 
disappointing to them if today’s conservatives cannot articulate a 
coherent conservative view of the role of the courts. But why should it 
matter to anyone else? The conservative Justices—all of the Justices, 
for that matter—go about their business, cast their votes, decide their 
cases. Who cares that we cannot, as observers, figure out a coherent, 
identifiably conservative view of what they are up to? 
That question—a totally fair question—brings me back to one of 
the points I began with. I said earlier that judicial conservatism cannot 
consist of simply deciding cases in the way a good lawyer would, 
because when a case gets to the Supreme Court, there is usually no 
agreement among good lawyers on how the case should come out. 
But suppose we accept that when cases get to the Supreme Court 
there is usually an element in them that requires the Justices to think 
about fairness, or public policy, or something like that. Why not just 
say that, at that point, Justices—conservative or otherwise—should 
just make the necessary judgment in good faith, as best they can? 
Who cares if the judgments they make cannot be arranged in an 
intellectually pleasing pattern that can be given a label like 
“conservative” or “liberal”? 
That view has a lot of common sense appeal. It may, however, 
leave unanswered some important questions about the 
appropriateness of the Supreme Court’s current role in our system of 
government. Without a coherent, articulable account of what the 
Justices should be doing, we may not be able to answer the question 
of why, exactly, the Supreme Court gets to second-guess the 
judgments made by the people’s elected representatives. 
Historically, the most plausible liberal answer to this question is 
that there are people in our society—political dissenters and racial 
and religious minorities, for example—who do not get their fair share 
in the political process, and the Court’s job is to stand up for those 
people.69 That was essentially the Warren Court’s answer.70 The 
 
 69. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 86 (1980) (discussing the 
proper role of the Supreme Court and explaining that “at least in some situations judicial 
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possible conservative approaches that I have sketched also provide 
plausible answers to that question. You can say, for example, that our 
political system tends to centralize power too much and that without 
the Court no one will pay sufficient attention to the prerogatives of 
state and local governments. Alternatively you might say, on a 
libertarian view, that governments tend to aggrandize themselves; 
government officials tend to think that the solution to a problem is for 
the government to exercise more power, and officials do not give 
enough weight to the rights of individuals—whether they are locking 
people up or regulating businesses—so judges should step in to 
protect individuals against that systematic failure of the government. 
That claim leaves plenty to debate about, but again, it is a plausible 
answer to the question of how to justify the Supreme Court’s role in 
our system. 
Now, maybe we do not need an answer of this kind, either liberal 
or conservative, to the question about the Supreme Court’s role in our 
system. Maybe it is enough to say that because our system has, for a 
while now, presupposed that the courts will play a certain role and has 
worked well enough, we should leave things alone. Or maybe it is 
enough to say simply that our system works better when significant 
power is given to people with the background, orientation, and 
incentives that are characteristic of Supreme Court Justices. But I am 
uncertain whether either of those is a completely satisfactory 
justification for the role that the courts play. And I doubt that today’s 
conservatives would want to sign on to either of those justifications. 
So Bush-era conservatives seem to be left without a coherent, 
principled approach and without an explanation of why the Supreme 
Court should be able to overturn decisions made by elected 
representatives. The question remains, as we enter a post-Bush period 
in which supposed judicial conservatives will continue to exercise 
power, just what judicial conservatism is. If there is no good answer to 
that question, then what is the justification for conservatives’ exercise 
of the power that they have now gained? 
 
 
intervention becomes appropriate when the existing processes of representation seem 
inadequately fitted to the representation of minority interests”). 
 70. Id. at 3, 135. 
